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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: In this paper we lay out the evaluation of non-compliance with the Code of 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and the analyses of the adequacy of the 
explanations provided thereof, including the overall effectiveness of the existing regulatory 
framework.  
Design/methodology/approach: To achieve the objectives of this study, a review of the non-
compliance section of the corporate governance statements of each Maltese listed company 
was carried out for the years 2012, 2014 and 2016. Furthermore, 13 semi-structured 
interviews were held.     
Findings: The paper finds that a general insufficiency in the explanations provided for non-
compliance exists. Some entities give only lip service to the provisions of the Code as they 
fail to realise the benefits an entity may reap from having good corporate governance 
structures in place. There is a lack of education and awareness in this regard, and not only 
on the part of companies but also on the part of shareholders who seem to make minimal use 
of the information provided in the corporate governance statements.  
Practical implications: The study raises awareness of the need of improving corporate 
governance practices, as well as education on corporate governance, across Maltese listed 
companies. It is hoped that the recommendations made may encourage entities to improve in 
their reporting and the regulator to provide further guidance to entities to do so. 
Originality/value: Prior to the amendment of existing rules, increased enforcement of the 
current regulatory framework and monitoring by the regulator is required. The study 
highlights the misconceptions on the auditor’s role in corporate governance.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the overhaul in corporate governance (‘CG’) regulation and increased 
awareness of the importance of CG in the modern economic environment, non-
compliance with CG codes is inadequately explained, and is an issue, which has 
shown to be persistent. As a result, several academics have arrived at the same 
conclusion as Giannakopoulou et al. (2016), Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud 
(2010) that companies simply abide by the requirements for the sake of being 
compliant, providing explanations which are “totally uninformative” (p.200). Thus, 
these companies “comply with the ‘letter’ of the law, but not with the ‘spirit’”(p. 
200), (Suryanto and Grima, 2018). 
 
This issue has also been highlighted in Malta where Azzopardi (2012) identified that 
one of the predominant weaknesses of corporate governance in Malta is "a general 
insufficiency in the reasons disclosed for non-adherence to the Code" (p.134). In 
fact, the inadequacy of explanations provided for deviations from the Code by 
Maltese listed companies (‘MLCs’) is the main issue which discourages users from 
relying on the information presented in the corporate governance statement (‘CGS’). 
Therefore, there is a lack of transparency, and it appears that the quality of 
explanations has not improved over the last few years (Debono, 2016). 
 
Although several studies on CG have been carried out in Malta, none specifically 
address the issue of non-compliance, and the explanations provided thereof. Thus, 
the main objective in this paper is for us, to present an analyses of the degree of non-
compliance and why this non-compliance exists, as well as to give an explanations 
on how this issue can be improved. In doing so, we also carry out an analysis of the 
existing regulatory framework, including an evaluation of the roles of the regulatory 
authority (‘RA’) and auditors in overseeing and reviewing CG in MLCs. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Code of Principles of Good Corporate Governance  
 
Malta first adopted a corporate governance code in 2001. The development of 
corporate governance in Malta, along with the initial drafting of The Code of 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance (‘the Code’), was profoundly influenced 
by its development in the UK and the OECD Principles of CG (Bezzina et al., 
2014). The Code applies to companies, which are listed on a regulated market. Such 
companies are expected to draw up a CGS in the annual report (MFSA, 2011).  
 
The Code, last revised in 2011, consists of twelve main principles. Adherence to the 
principles of the Code increases transparency, disclosure and shareholder protection. 
The Code adopts a comply-or-explain (‘CoE’) approach, whereby companies either 
comply with the principles or provide reasons for non-compliance (MFSA, 2011). 
  
 P.J. Baldacchino, C. Vella, S. Grima 
  
73  
2.2 The Comply-or-Explain Principle 
 
The intention of CG codes adopting a CoE approach is not for companies to comply 
with all the principles therein, but rather, when provisions are not suitable for certain 
organisations, then they are not expected to comply (Seidl et al., 2009). Thus, the 
CoE principle grants flexibility as it acknowledges the fact that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach to CG is inappropriate, as no single company is the same as another 
(MacNeil and Li, 2006). Nonetheless, in the event of deviations, companies must 
give an adequate explanation for non-compliance (Seidl et al., 2009).  
 
Inadequate explanations for non-compliance undermine the whole point of the CoE 
principle (Seidl et al., 2013) because its core lies in the company’s obligation to 
disclose reasons for non-compliance (MacNeil and Li, 2006). As a result, when the 
CoE principle is used superficially, transparency is considerably diluted (Sergakis, 
2015). After all, it is where adequate and meaningful explanations are provided, that 
the flexibility of the CoE principle is beneficial. Otherwise, the 'explain' part of CG 
codes will have no relative significance (Arcot et al., 2010).   
 
2.3 The Roles of Auditors and the Regulatory Authority 
 
(i) THE ROLE OF AUDITORS 
The effective application of the CoE principle also requires the involvement of 
auditors, for the purpose of disclosing the adequacy of reporting on CG (Horak and 
Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 2011). In Malta, Listing Rule 5.98 requires the external auditor 
of the company to draw up a report, which confirms that the CGS has been prepared 
in line with the Code and that it includes the disclosures required by the Listing 
Rules. This report is part of the annual report, and it is distinct from the opinion on 
the financial statements. However, the auditor is not obliged to give any assurance 
on the CG function within the entity (Listing Authority, 2018).  
 
Although it may be argued that the auditor's role is vital as verification could 
enhance the quality of CGSs (Shrives and Brennan, 2015), as things stand, the 
auditor only confirms that the CGS has been prepared in line with the Code. In fact, 
Cauchi's findings show that only 50% of investors believe that the auditor's review 
increases their level of confidence in the CGS (Cauchi, 2009). It seems that auditors 
participate in "standard ritualistic behaviour" (Shrives and Brennan, 2015, p.91), 
not only because they use similar wording and structures of the report, but they also 
fail to raise any particular concerns on issues relating to non-compliance or the 
quality of explanations (Shrives and Brennan, 2015). 
   
(ii) THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Regulatory frameworks adopting the CoE approach generally empower shareholders 
to evaluate and respond to non-compliance themselves, always assuming that an 
efficient market is in place (Keay, 2014). However, in practice, involvement on the 
part of shareholders is minimal as no such monitoring of CG practices is taking 
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place (Horak and Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 2011). In fact, this is the current situation in 
Malta, as shareholders merely focus “on the dividends and share prices” (Schembri, 
2016, p.101).  Therefore, oversight of compliance with the recommendations of CG 
codes and action in the event of misleading disclosures is required by RAs to 
improve the exercise of the CoE principle (Horak and Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 2011).  
Through their involvement, regulators will enable better communication, exchange 
of views and interaction between users of the CoE principle (Sergakis, 2015).  
 
Despite the possible advantages of regulatory oversight and sanctions, some argued 
that it may lead to undermining the shareholder’s role in CG and the voluntary 
nature of CG codes (Davies et al., 2011; Financial Reporting Council, 2011).  
Furthermore, if a regulator is appointed, this could not only result in additional costs 
but could also lead to an ‘us vs them’ scenario (Keay, 2014). Thus, for regulatory 
oversight to be beneficial to CG, the regulatory body must encourage the 
comprehensive and reliable disclosure of information, while ensuring that the quality 
of the information provided is preserved (Keay, 2014).  
 
A number of Maltese studies (Azzopardi, 2012; Debono, 2016; Gatt, 2017; 
Schembri, 2016) have also pointed towards the involvement of RAs in ensuring 
adequate explanations for non-compliance with the Code. These explanations have 
shown to be insufficient and as a result, require users to find other means to 
determine the reasons for such non-compliance. It seems that it is not stricter 
regulations that are necessary, but rather more supervision on the existing rules 
(Debono, 2016). 
  
2.4 Non-Compliance to the Corporate Governance Code 
 
Several academics have looked into the aspect of non-compliance with national CG 
codes. A recurring issue that has come to light is the fact that non-compliance is not 
sufficiently explained, and in some cases, no explanation is provided at all 
(Akkermans et al., 2007; Arcot et al., 2010). Explanations provided for non-
compliance, fail to adequately explain the reasons for such deviations and very 
often, companies, which fail to comply usually, provide similar insufficient 
explanations (Arcot et al., 2010). These findings have led to the repeated conclusion 
of compliance, which is in actual fact "symbolic" (Akkermans et al., 2007, p.1106), 
as companies adhere to CG codes for the sake of being compliant, and thus 
circumvent the real intention of such codes (Arcot et al., 2010). As a result, CG is 
viewed as a "box-checking exercise" (Bozec and Dia, 2012, p.243), rather than 
essential practice embedded in an organisation's culture.  
 
Malta is no exception to this. In fact, one of the main weaknesses concerning CG in 
MLCs is the overall inadequacy of the explanations provided in terms of non-
compliance with the Code (Azzopardi, 2012). Schembri’s findings (2016) also 
highlighted the fact that MLCs provide inadequate justifications for deviations from 
the principles of the Code. In fact, he added that it is as if listed entities expect 
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stakeholders to rely on their good faith, without providing any suitable explanation 
for non-compliance. Furthermore, Baldacchino et al. (2015 and 2017) concluded 
that the only reason why MLCs are complying with the Code is that they are obliged 
to do so by the Listing Rules, while Baldacchino et al. (2018) held that companies 
only adhere superficially with the Code. All these factors point towards a symbolic 
form of compliance. These findings are therefore comparable to the aforementioned 
studies.   
 
Thus, there is a recurring need for the improvement of explanations for non-
compliance, whereby companies have to provide more meaningful justifications to 
stakeholders. In fact, the EC4 highlighted the need for the enhancement of the 
quality of explanations for non-compliance since the majority are unsatisfactory, and 
there is inadequate regulatory oversight in most Member States (European 
Commission, 2011). The EC also issued a Recommendation on this issue in 2014 
wherein Section III paragraph 8 it outlined that in cases of non-compliance, 
companies should: 
 
- explain in what manner the company has departed from a 
recommendation;  
- describe the reasons for the departure;  
- describe how the decision to depart from the recommendation was taken 
within the company;  
- where the departure is limited in time, explain when the company 
envisages complying with a particular recommendation;  
- where applicable, describe the measure taken instead of compliance 
and explain how that measure achieves the underlying objective of the 
specific recommendation or of the code as a whole, or clarify how it 
contributes to good corporate governance of the company  (European 
Commission, 2014, p.4) 
 
By providing such information, companies will give shareholders and other 
stakeholders the opportunity to adequately assess the implications of non-
compliance with the principles of CG codes (European Commission, 2014).  
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
To collect the primary data we used two sources. The first source included an 
analysis of the annual reports of listed companies as may be seen in Table A1 in 
Appendix 1. The non-compliance section of the CGSs of equity companies listed on 
the MSE was analysed in detail and compared to the Code for the years 2012, 2014 
and 2016. As at 31st March 2018, twenty-three companies had an equity listing on 
the MSE and in total, fifty-six5 CGSs were analysed. In reviewing these statements, 
                                                     
4 European Commission’s Green Paper - The EU corporate governance framework. 
5 Vide Appendix 3.1 for list of Corporate Governance Statements Analysed. 
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the focus was placed on the explanations provided by MLCs to determine or 
otherwise their adequacy in terms of the requirements, and the spirit of the Code.  
 
In the 2nd instance, semi-structured interviews were also carried out.  These were 
mainly targeted towards the company secretaries of the MLCs, since in the majority 
of cases, if not all, it is the latter who prepare the CGS of the company. Furthermore, 
since the roles of auditors and the RA was also evaluated in terms of the Maltese 
regulatory framework, interviews were also held with members of audit firms as 
well as a representative of the MFSA. In total, thirteen interviews were carried out, 
whereby nine were held with members of MLCs, three with audit firm 
representatives and one with a representative of the MFSA. Interview questions 
were adapted according to the interviewee.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1 The Maltese Regulatory Framework  
 
This study found that the Code allows for the setup of appropriate CG structures in 
MLCs (13/13). As highlighted by two interviewees (2/13), it seems that the issues 
that arise in CG are not as a result of the Code itself but rather due to its 
implementation. It is where entities comply with the letter but not with the spirit of 
the Code that the existing framework loses its effectiveness. As a result, this issue 
sparks debate on whether the Code should be made mandatory. This study found 
great resistance to the latter (12/13), with many participants expressing that this 
would result in a one-size-fits-all set of rules leading to no other than a box-ticking 
exercise. Indeed, this study found that the existing CG framework, that is a code 
based on the CoE principle, is an effective approach to CG as it grants flexibility. 
However, it was also highlighted that for the existing framework to be effective, it 
requires adequate and meaningful explanations for non-compliance.  
 
This is understandable, given that good governance is not simply determined by the 
structures or procedures an entity has in place, but by its commitment to adopt these 
principles in its day-to-day activities. Thus, what is required is more awareness on 
the importance of CG so that companies can understand the real implications behind 
having good CG systems in place, and the benefits an organisation may reap by 
implementing these structures. This coupled with increased regulatory involvement 
may be a better alternative to the mandatory imposition of all principles. 
 
4.2 The Roles of Auditors and the Regulatory Authority 
 
(i) THE ROLE OF AUDITORS 
This study found that the auditor’s role in CG is rather relevant since ultimately the 
information in the CGS is being corroborated. Indeed, research participants agreed 
that the auditor’s report on CG increases shareholders’ confidence on the CGS (x̅ = 
4.00). However, this study also highlighted the misconceptions on the auditor’s role 
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on the part of MLCs since most disagreed that in practice auditors do not really 
provide assurance on the CG function (x̅=2.92). Thus, while the auditor is not 
obliged to give any assurance on the CG function, it seems that there exist an 
expectations gap of what auditors are actually confirming in their report on CG. In 
fact, MLC representatives (5/9) themselves emphasised that auditors give a lot of 
significance to the CGS and that what it includes reflects reality. On the other hand, 
Debono (2016) held that financial analysts and major shareholders believed that 
“auditors barely do anything to ascertain [the CGS’] reliability” (Debono, 2016, 
p.71). Therefore, this indicates that the auditor’s real efforts are unknown to external 
parties. Thus, the misconceptions on the auditor’s role go both ways. While MLCs 
attribute the auditor’s involvement to providing assurance due to their thorough 
review of the CGS and CG practices thereof, their work may be hidden to other 
stakeholders.  
 
(ii) THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY  
This study highlights that while the MFSA has the authority to initiate various 
regulatory actions against MLCs for non-compliance since compliance is a 
requirement of the Listing Rules, no such action has ever been instituted. 
Compliance procedures on the CGS have never been carried out by the authority 
owing to other supervisory priorities. However, there are plans for this work to be 
carried out in the near future. As is the norm, the authority will try to adopt a fair 
process, whereby communication is exchanged before taking corrective action in the 
form of fines, penalties or requesting company announcements.  
 
Nevertheless, views on increased regulatory involvement amongst different 
interviewees were contrasting. While both the MFSA and audit firm representatives 
(4/4) agreed that more involvement is required on the part of the regulator, 
unsurprisingly, in the case of MLC interviewees most (7/9) did not agree there 
should be more involvement by the regulator since the regulator is already involved 
in many other issues, and according to one of them (1/7), there needs to be a limit to 
regulatory involvement as it can result in an “overkill of regulation”.   
 
Regulatory involvement will undoubtedly result in several advantages and, given the 
current situation, such involvement is essential. However, there may be a fine line 
with the authority going overboard. As indicated by Keay (2014), the important 
thing is that the regulator is not simply considered as a watchdog imposing fines or 
penalties, but one who also provides a supporting role. The authority needs to strive 
to build a relationship based on communication, making itself more accessible to 
MLCs to ask for guidance if necessary. At the same time, it needs to keep its stand 
as regulator and take the necessary and proper corrective action where required in a 
timely and consistent manner. 
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4.3 Non-Compliance to the Corporate Governance Code 
  
(I) PREPARATION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STATEMENT  
The review of the annual reports of MLCs highlighted a number of differences in 
reporting of the CGSs across different entities. The main issues were in terms of the 
format of the CGS. For instance, in the case of one particular MLC, while the Code 
outlines that the CGS is to be divided into two main sections, with the first section 
dealing with compliance to the principles and the second section dealing with non-
compliance, no such distinction was made in the CGSs analysed.  
 
Although entities have a responsibility to provide adequate disclosure, one may also 
question whether the Code provides enough guidance to MLCs in the preparation of 
their CGS.  The Code itself simply requires the CGS to include one section dealing 
with compliance with the Code and another section dealing with non-compliance, 
including descriptions providing shareholders with “a clear and comprehensive 
picture of a company’s governance arrangements” (MFSA, 2011, p.1). Similarly, in 
terms of the explanations, the Code requires “a careful and clear explanation which 
shareholders should evaluate on its merits” (MFSA, 2011, p.1). Considering that 
this is a fairly recent requirement and that no regulatory monitoring has taken place 
so far, one must appreciate that MLCs have been going through a continuous 
learning process.  
 
The MFSA representative held that the Code was even vaguer prior to the 2011 
amendments, yet s/he also pointed out that there is still room for improvement. This 
could possibly be in the form of further guidance in the preparation of the CGS on 
the MFSA’s part. In fact, this was also suggested by one of the interviewees (1/13). 
However, entities currently resort to their auditors or each other for mutual support. 
Indeed, a number of company secretary interviewees (3/7) also mentioned that they 
form part of a forum giving the opportunity to communicate and exchange 
regulatory ideas, including those on CG. 
  
(II)  ADHERENCE TO THE CODE  
The explanations provided in the non-compliance section of the CGSs by MLCs 
were analysed to identify the main areas of non-compliance with the Code. Table 1 
Identifies the main areas of non-compliance as reported by MLCs in the non-
compliance section of their CGS. The main non-compliance areas are ranked in 
order of decreasing instances of non-compliance. 
 
Table 1. Code Areas Breached by MLCs 
Code Area 2012 2014 2016 Total 
Provision 9.3 
Mechanism to resolve conflicts between 
minority and controlling shareholders. 
13 14 16 43 
Provision 
4.2.7 
Succession Policy for the BOD. 12 12 15 39 
Principle 8B Nomination Committee. 14 12 12 38 
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Principle 3 
BOD should be composed of executive 
and non-executive directors. 
5 6 7 18 
Principle 7 Evaluation of the Board’s Performance. 3 5 5 13 
Provision 7.1 
Appointing a Committee to carry out the 
performance evaluation. 
4 4 4 12 
Provision 2.3 A chairman should be independent. 3 3 3 9 
Provision 
8.A.1 
Remuneration Committee should be 
chaired by an independent non-executive 
director. 
2 3 3 8 
Principle 2 Chairman and Chief Executive. 3 2 1 6 
Provision 2.1 
Division of responsibilities between 
Chairman and Chief Executive should be 
set out in writing. 
2 2 2 6 
Principle 6 Succession plan for senior management. 2 1 3 6 
Provision 9.4 
Minority shareholders should be allowed 
to present issues to the BOD. 
1 1 4 6 
Principle 8A Remuneration Committee. 1 1 3 5 
Provision 4.3 
The BOD should organise regular 
information Sessions. 
2 2 1 5 
Provision 3.1 
BOD should appoint one of the 
independent non-executive directors to be 
a senior independent director. 
1 1 1 3 
Provision 
6.4.1 
Provision of professional training 
sessions. 
1 1 1 3 
Provision 
4.2.3  
 
A member of the audit committee shall be 
independent. 
1 1 0 2 
Provision 5.2 
Attendance of board members should be 
reported to shareholders at annual general 
meetings. 
1 1 0 2 
Other Various areas 1 3 6 10 
Total  72 75 87 234 
 
As identified from the table, most instances of non-compliance related to Provision 
9.3, which requires entities to establish procedures to resolve conflicts between 
minority and controlling shareholders. Provision 4.2.7 which requires an entity to 
develop a succession policy for the Board of Directors (‘BOD’) also showed a high 
level of non-compliance, as well as Principle 8B which requires MLCs to set up a 
Nomination Committee. Furthermore, there were no instances of non-compliance 
reported in terms of Principles 10, 11 and 12. These findings are similar to what was 
found by Baldacchino et al. (2015) who identified that instances of non-compliance 
“mainly related to shareholder conflicts, the absence of the Nominations Committee 
and the lack of board performance evaluation” (Baldacchino et al., 2015, p.15). 
 
The persistent non-compliance in these areas may be indicative of their limited 
applicability in MLCs, especially in companies, which are smaller in size. In fact, 
this study found that the main reasons for non-compliance amongst MLC 
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interviewees (7/9) were due to practical problems where the principles or provisions 
of the Code are inapplicable to the entity.  This is why entities need to be given an 
opportunity to explain where they are not compliant as otherwise, structures will be 
put in place only to “rubber stamp” what the Code requires.  After all, it is the 
intention of the Code to allow flexibility, where as long as adequate explanations for 
non-compliance are provided to users, non-compliance is acceptable.  
 
Therefore, the question is not whether or not the level of compliance with the Code 
is satisfactory, as the Code itself permits non-compliance. Rather, the question is 
whether, through their explanations, MLCs give comfort to shareholders that despite 
those instances of non-compliance, the entity has adopted a system of good 
governance. Yet in a number of MLCs, this is evidently not the case. 
 
(III) EXPLANATIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE  
As stated earlier6, in its recommendations the EC identified five components to be 
included in an explanation for non-compliance. To obtain a better understanding of 
what interviewees would consider being a useful explanation, respondents were 
asked to rate their agreement to these five components, as demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure  1. Statements related to Explanations for Non-Compliance  
 
 
This results of the study revealed that of these five components, the most important 
aspects of an explanation for non-compliance are the manner in which the company 
has departed from the Code (x̅=4.23) and the reasons for that departure (x̅=4.23), 
together with a description of the measures taken instead of compliance (x̅=4.08), 
                                                     
6 Vide Section 2.4. 
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where applicable. However, the other two components were not seen to be as 
significant. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the annual reports revealed several issues concerning 
the explanations, particularly that while in general, almost all companies identify the 
manner in which they departed from the principles or provisions of the Code, a few 
companies simply state that they are not compliant, without providing any 
explanation thereof. Some examples are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Why are the Reasons for Non-Compliance being Omitted? 
Bank of Valletta plc 2016 – Principle 7: 
“During the year under review, the Board did not undertake an evaluation of its own 
performance, the Chairman’s performance and that of its committees.” (p.33) 
Lombard Bank Malta plc 2016 – Provision 9.3: 
“There are no procedures disclosed in the Bank’s Memorandum or Articles as 
recommended in Code Provision 9.3 to resolve conflicts between minority shareholders 
and controlling shareholders.” (p.19) 
Plaza Centres plc 2016 – Provision 9.4: 
“Plaza does not have a policy in place to allow minority shareholders to present an issue 
to the Board.” (p.16)  
 
Similarly, there are instances whereby an entity provides reasons for non-compliance 
where companies explain that the BOD “believes” or “feels” that something is 
appropriate, but they do not outline the reasoning behind such conclusions. 
Similarly, in other cases, entities justify non-compliance by stating that the BOD did 
not consider it “necessary” to be carried out.  Table 3 provides examples of this. 
 
Table 3. How Valid is the Stated Justification for Non-Compliance?  
Plaza Centres plc 2016 – Provision 2.1: 
“Although the posts of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer are occupied by 
different individuals in line with Code Provision 2.1, the division of their responsibilities 
has not been set out in writing. Nevertheless, the Board feels that there are significant 
experience and practice that determines the two roles.” (p.16) 
MIDI plc 2016 – Principle 7: 
“In the context of the nature of the Company's operations and the stage of its operations 
together with the composition and roles of the Board, the Board did not consider that such 
a formal evaluation of performance was necessary, nonetheless a review of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each director is taken into consideration when reviewing the 
composition of the Board's committees.” (p.21) 
 
Perhaps the agency theory could help in explaining the reason why although the 
MLCs are aware that the reason for the departure from the Code is an essential 
requirement, some still fail to provide this fundamental piece of information. MLCs 
are providing explanations that will satisfy their own needs while portraying to 
shareholders that they adhere to CG regulation. In this respect, Bozec and Dia 
(2012), Grima et. al., (2017) maintain that companies do seek to adhere symbolically 
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to the code to portray a reputable image, with the objective to reduce the costs 
consequent to non-compliance and/or monitoring by RAs. 
 
Furthermore, the study results revealed that in the case of breaches from the Code 
which remain the same from year to year, MLCs tend to use the same explanation or 
very similar explanations. In most cases, it is only when there are changes, 
particularly if in one year the entity is non-compliant with a principle, but in the 
following year it is or vice-versa, that the explanations provided are different.  
Examples of this are provided in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Should there be CG Improvement Over Time?   
RS2 Software plc 2012, 2014 & 2016 – Principle 2: 
“Code Provision 2.3 states that the Chairman should be independent. Mr Mario Schembri, 
who currently holds the position of Chairman, cannot be deemed independent due to his 
involvement held in the Company.”  (2016, p.38) 
International Hotel Investments plc 2012, 2014 & 2016 – Principle 7: 
“Under the present circumstances, the board does not consider it necessary to appoint a 
committee to carry out a performance evaluation of its role, as the board’s performance is 
always under the scrutiny of the shareholders.” (2016, p.13) 
 
Similarities are also evident in the explanations of different firms. In some cases, the 
explanations used are practically the same, except for a few minor changes in 
wording. This could be indicative that the same author is behind the wording.  Table 
5 presents examples of similar explanations across different MLCs. 
 
Table 5. Why are CGSs so alike despite being Unstructured?  
Grand Harbour Marina plc & Medserv plc 2016 – Provision 9.3: 
A. Grand Harbour Marina plc: “The Company does not have a formal mechanism in 
place as required by Code provision 9.3 to resolve conflicts between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders and no such conflicts have arisen.” (p.20) 
B. Medserv plc: “The Company does not have a formal mechanism in place as required 
by Code provision 9.3 to resolve conflicts between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders and no such conflicts have arisen.” (p.22)  
Tigne Mall plc & MIDI plc 2016 – Provision 4.2.7: 
A. Tigne Mall Plc: “The Board notes that pursuant to the Company’s Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, the appointment of Directors to serve on the Board of 
Directors is a matter which is entirely reserved to the shareholders of the Company. 
Thus, the Board does not consider it practical to develop a succession policy for the 
future composition of the Board. However, as indicated in the statement of 
compliance, all newly appointed Directors are given an adequate induction course in 
the operations, activities and procedures of the Company to be able to carry out the 
function of a Director in an effective manner. The Board also notes the emphasis in 
this Code provision on the executive component of the Board and points out that the 
Company’s Board is composed entirely of non-executive members.” (p.14) 
B. MIDI plc: “The Board notes that pursuant to the Company's Memorandum and 
Articles of Association of the Company, the appointment of directors to serve on the 
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Board of Directors is a matter which is entirely reserved to the shareholders of the 
Company, who are afforded the power to nominate and elect a new board of directors 
on an annual basis. Thus, the Board does not consider it practical to develop a 
succession policy for the future composition of the Board. However, as indicated in the 
statement of compliance, all newly appointed directors are given a thorough induction 
course in the operations, activities and procedures of the Company by Senior 
Management to be able to carry out the function of a Director in an effective manner.” 
(p.21) 
 
Using boilerplate language makes the CGS lose its importance, as rather than 
reflecting the entity’s situation, it becomes another generic statement, which is 
prepared only for the sake of apparently abiding by the regulations. As indicated by 
Hooghiemstra and van Ees (2011), this type of behaviour results in a one-size-fits-all 
approach, leaving no significant influence on users.  
 
Therefore, one may ask whether this form of tackling the Code is of any benefit to 
the stakeholders, including the entity itself. This type of behaviour may also be 
indicative of MLCs’ failure to realise that having a system of good governance in 
place has its advantages, affecting all aspects of the organisation. Until such 
realisation takes effect, there will be much a reluctance to prepare a CGS tailored to 
the organisation.  
 
Inadequate explanations for non-compliance mirror MLCs failure to observe the real 
intention of the Code, while confirming that some entities comply with the Code 
only because it is required by law. The indications are that CG is seldom given the 
importance, which it merits. Of course, box-ticking from year to year without 
improvement leads to nowhere. The impetus has to be there for implementing a real 
governance system across the organisation.  
 
4.4 Improving Non-Compliance 
 
This study highlighted that rather than being a matter of deficient regulatory 
framework, the present predicament has more to do with a lack of regulatory 
enforcement. This has also been previously pointed out in the literature. In fact, the 
MFSA Representative held that before making any further changes to the existing 
code, the RA must initially review current practices to identify any “existing gaps” 
which will then be addressed accordingly, possibly through changing existing rules, 
or by means of developing new rules. Indeed, interviewees themselves pointed out to 
the need for more monitoring when asked what measures could be taken to improve 
the quality of the explanations. Despite the fact that Malta agreed with the setting up 
of a monitoring body to review the substance of the explanations provided (Ministry 
of Finance, the Economy and Investment, 2011), no such monitoring has yet taken 
place.  It is clear that such monitoring is essential for the improvement of CG 
practices in Malta, not only for regulations to be enforced, but also because the 
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pressure is thereby created on MLCs to improve in their reporting if the regulator 
shows more interest in CG practices. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
We conclude that very few MLCs have embodied CG as a central part of their 
organisation and this is evident in the misapplication of the Code. In the first place, 
prior to the amendment of existing rules, enforcement of the existing regulatory 
framework is required. In this regard, regulatory involvement is essential, not only in 
the form of monitoring and enforcement but also in terms of providing further 
guidance to MLCs in the preparation of their CGS. As regards the auditor’s role, 
while in some instances it is not clear what auditors are actually confirming in their 
report on CG, widening the auditor’s responsibilities may lead to independence 
issues.  
 
Furthermore, this study confirms that the explanations for non-compliance with the 
CG Code as a whole are far from satisfactory.  The vagueness of the Code itself and 
the lack of regulatory guidance may contribute to this inadequate disclosure. 
Nevertheless, entities seem to be aware of what is generally expected of them. 
Despite this, in some instances MLCs still fail to provide adequate explanations, 
confirming that they only comply cosmetically with the Code. Thus, there is much 
room for better explanations. At the same time, the lack of interest on the part of 
shareholders may prevent entities from realising that there is such a need.  
 
Therefore, there is ample room for improvement in non-compliance with the CG 
Code. Regulatory enforcement of the existing rules is essential to identify possible 
ways in which the existing regulatory framework may be improved, together with 
increased efforts in educating both MLCs and shareholders on CG and its benefits.  
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Appendices:  
Table A1: Corporate Governance Statements Analysed   
Company Name  2012 2014 2016 
Bank of Valletta plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
HSBC Bank Malta plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lombard Bank Malta plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mapfre Middlesea plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Simonds Farsons Cisk plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GO plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
International Hotel Investments plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Plaza Centres plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GlobalCapital plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FIMBank plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Malta International Airport plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Santumas Shareholdings plca   ✓ 
Medserv plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Grand Harbour Marina plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
MaltaPost plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
RS2 Software plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
MIDI plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Malita Investments plc ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Tigne Mall plcb  ✓ ✓ 
Pefaco International plcc  ✓  
Malta Properties Company plcd   ✓ 
PG plce    
Trident Estates plcf    
Total for each year 17 19 20 
Total reports analysed  56 
 
Notes: 
aSantumas Shareholdings plc held a Collective Investment Scheme License up until 9 
October 2014. On the same date it was admitted as a Property Company on the Malta Stock 
Exchange.  
bTigne Mall plc was admitted to listing in May 2013.  
cPefaco International plc was admitted to listing on the Malta Stock Exchange on 25 th July 
2014. The annual report for the year ending 31st December 2016 was not available on the 
company website, or on the MFSA website.  
dMalta Properties Company plc was listed in 2015.  
ePG plc was listed on 25th November 2016.  
fTrident Estates plc was admitted on 30th January 2018.  
 
Interview Schedule 
This appendix consists of the interview schedule used to collect the data for the purpose of 
this dissertation. The number of responses for each of the closed-ended questions – Qn5, 
Qn8, Qn22 and Qn30 - are also included in bold and italics in the schedule.  
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Section A 
The Maltese Regulatory Framework 
Part 1 – The Code of Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
1. Do you believe that the Code allows for the setup of appropriate corporate 
governance structures in listed companies? In what ways? 
2. Should the Code of Principles of Good Corporate Governance be made 
mandatory? Why/Why not? 
3. Should the Code distinguish between small, medium and large listed 
companies? Why/why not?  
Part 2 – The Comply-or-Explain Principle 
1. The Code is based on the ‘Comply-or-Explain’ approach, whereby companies are 
expected to either comply with the principles of the Code or otherwise provide 
reasons for non-compliance. To what extent do you believe that this is an effective 
approach to corporate governance?  
2. Do you agree that the comply-or-explain principle: 
Please rate: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
2.1. Grants Flexibility.      
2.2. Acknowledges that a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach to corporate 
governance is 
inappropriate. 
     
2.3. Allows shareholders to 
appropriately monitor 
and assess corporate 
governance practices in 
different organisations. 
     
2.4. Requires adequate and 
meaningful 
explanations for non-
compliance to fulfil its 
purpose. 
     
2.5. Is undermined by 
shareholders’ lack of 
interest in monitoring it 
in practice. 
     
 
Section B 
The Roles of Auditors and the Regulatory Authority 
4. Do you believe that shareholders adequately monitor and respond to non-
compliance? If yes, from your experience, in what ways do shareholders do 
so? 
Part 1 – Auditors 
5. For interviewees in audit firms. To what extent do you believe that your role in 
corporate governance is relevant? 
6. Do you agree with these statements?  
 
Please rate: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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6.1. The auditor’s report on 
corporate    governance 
increases shareholders’ 
confidence of the 
Corporate Governance 
Statement. 
     
6.2.  
(i) In practice, auditors 
do not really provide 
assurance on the 
adequateness of the 
corporate governance 
function, and; 
     
(ii) The law is unclear in 
this regard. 
     
6.3.  
(i) Auditors should 
provide an opinion on 
whether explanations 
for non-compliance 
are adequate, and; 
     
(ii) The law should 
require this 
     
6.4. Shareholders would 
find the auditor’s report 
on corporate 
governance more 
relevant if the auditor 
expressed an opinion on 
non-compliance with 
the Code.  
     
6.5. The auditor’s current 
role in corporate    
governance is 
sufficient. 
0 3 0 10 0 
 
7. Are there any other/alternative ways in which the auditor may be involved in an 
entity’s corporate governance function? 
 
Part 2 – The Regulatory Authority 
Questions 10 - 16 apply only for interviewees in the regulatory authority. 
8. Is it within the capacity of the authority to initiate action against a listed company for 
non-compliance?  
9. If yes, has the authority ever instituted action against a company? What type?  
10. To your knowledge, has the authority ever received complaints regarding non-
compliance and the explanations thereof from shareholders and/or other stakeholders?  
11. Do you think that more involvement on your part could improve the issue of the lack 
of adequate explanations for non-compliance?  
12. If yes, what type of involvement?  
13. What sanctions, if any, may be imposed? 
14. Have such sanctions ever been imposed? If not, should they be introduced? 
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Questions 17 - 20 apply only for interviewees in listed companies and audit firms. 
 
15. Should there be more involvement in corporate governance practices by the regulatory 
authority? Why/Why not? 
16. If yes, what type of involvement?  
17. Should sanctions be imposed by the regulator in serious cases of non-compliance?  
18. If, yes what type of sanctions? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
